We study an n-player averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in two distinct application domains: i) coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) and ii) opinion propagation. We study conditions under which the average allocations achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set.
INTRODUCTION
We consider an n-player averaging process in which each player is described by a dynamic system with controlled and uncontrolled inputs, the latter being adversarial disturbances. Motivations for the dynamics can be found in two distinct application domains. Within the realm of allocation problems in coalitional games with Transferable Utilities (TU games) (Nedić and Bauso, 2013) , the process describes a two-step distributed allocation process where, at each discrete time step, players first renegotiate their past allocations and second generate a new revenue and allocate it. On the other hand, the dynamics also arise naturally in opinion propagation, where the players adjust their opinions based on the inputs received from neighbors, and under the influence of persuaders.
The goal of our study is to provide a detailed analysis of the consensus dynamics under the umbrella of contractivity and invariance theory. In particular, we consider a predefined set and study convergence of the consensus value to such a set under a distributed receding horizon control law. This set can be thought of as (but it is not limited to) the core of the game for the allocation process. This is the set of imputations under which no coalition has a value greater than the sum of its members' payoffs. Therefore, no coalition has incentive to leave the grand coalition and receive a larger payoff. A similar problem is addressed by Bauso and Notarstefano (2012) , which considers the case of allocations evolving according to doubly averaging dynamics (over time as well as space).
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a distributed multi-stage receding horizon control strategy and to show that it ensures the existence of invariant and contractive sets for the collective dynamics (Theorem 1).
Related literature. Coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) were first introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) . In this work a central issue is to determine whether the core is an "approachable" set, and which allocation processes can drive the "complaint vector" to that set. Approachability theory was developed by Blackwell (1956) , and is captured in the well known Blackwell's Theorem. The geometric (approachability) principle that lies behind Blackwell's Theorem is among the fundamentals in allocation processes in coalitional games (Lehrer, 2002) . The discrete-time dynamics analyzed in this paper follow the rules of typical consensus dynamics (see e.g. Nedić, Ozdaglar, and Parrilo, 2010, and references therein). Consensus dynamics also arise in the literature on agreement among multiple agents. An underlying communication graph for the agents and balancing weights are used to reach an agreement on a common decision variable in Nedić et al. (2010) and Ram et al. (2009) for distributed multi-agent optimization, and related problems of aggregation in multi-agent systems are studied in Shi and Hong (2009) and Liu et al. (2012) .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the problem while Section 3 gives the main results. Section 4 provides numerical illustrations. Finally, in Section 5, provides concluding remarks and future directions.
Notation. We let x denote the transpose of a vector x, and x denote its Euclidean norm. An n × n matrix A is row-stochastic if the matrix has nonnegative entries a i j and n j=1 a i j = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. For a matrix A, we use a i j or [A] ij to denote its ijth entry. A matrix A is doubly stochastic if both A and its transpose A are rowstochastic. We use |S| for the cardinality of a given finite set S. We write P X [x] to denote the projection of a vector x on a set X, and we write |x| X for the distance from x to X, i.e., P X [x] = arg min y∈X x − y and |x| X = x − P X [x] , respectively.
DISTRIBUTED REWARD ALLOCATION
Every player in a set N = {1, . . . , n} is characterized by an average allocation vector x i (t) ∈ R n . At every time he renegotiates with neighbors all past allocations and generates a new allocation vector u i (t). Then, the cumulative (over time) allocation x i (t) to player i evolves as follows
where
is a vector of nonnegative weights consistent with the sparsity of the communication graph G(t) = (N, E(t)). A link (j, i) ∈ E(t) exists (and hence a i j (t) = 0) if player j is a neighbor of player i at time t, i.e. if player i renegotiates allocations with player j at time t. For each player i ∈ N , the input u i (·) is the payoff of a repeated two-player game between player i (Player i 1 ) and an (external) adversary (Player i 2 ). Let S 1 and S 2 be the finite set of actions of players i 1 and i 2 respectively and let us denote the set of mixed action pairs by ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ) (set of probability distributions on S 1 and S 2 ). For any pair of mixed strategies (p(t), q(t)) ∈ ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ) for player i 1 and i 2 at time t, the expected payoff is
Essentially, in the above game φ(j, k) ∈ R n is the vector payoff when players i 1 and i 2 play pure strategies j ∈ S 1 and k ∈ S 2 respectively. Figure 2 illustrates the continuous action sets for the two players. Let X ⊂ R n be a closed convex target set (or a convex subset of a nonconvex target set), and consider the case where player i 1 seeks to drive the state x i (t) towards X, while player i 2 tries to push the state far from it. The resulting strategy can be formulated as the solution of a robust optimization problem, with one player minimizing and the other maximizing the distance of the state from X.
In compact form the problem with finite horizon [0, T ] to be solved by player i takes the form:
where w i (t) is the space average defined as
Let ξ(t) = x 1 (t), . . . , x n (t) denote the collective state of all players in N at time t. We introduce a value function V i,τ (ξ(t), t) representing the optimal cost over τ steps starting at x i (t), where
Using dynamic programming and the Bellman principle, the value function must satisfy the following recursion
The space average in (1) implies that the distance from X of the state x i at any time more than one step into the future will depend on the current and future actions of players in N other than player i. To realise a distributed allocation strategy in which u i (t) is determined without collaboration or knowledge of the current or future actions of other players, we therefore incorporate maximization over u j (t), j ∈ N , j = i when computing the worst case cost-to-go in the above problem formulation.
The receding horizon implementation of the optimal strategy for player i defines p(t), and hence u i (t) in (2), as the minimizing argument for the T -stage problem with optimal value function V i,T (ξ(·), ·). The stability of a receding horizon control law can be ensured (Mayne et al., 2000) by imposing a terminal constraint such as x i (T ) ∈ X ∀i ∈ N . However this would require collaboration or knowledge of the actions of other players in N , and instead we therefore impose the local constraint |x i (t + 1)| X ≤ |w i (t)| X . Since this constraint involves only u i (t) and w i (t), it does not depend on bounds on the allocations of other players which could lead to conservative terminal constraints. We show that it nonetheless results in a global contractivity property. The modified problem formulation can now be restated as
Our goal is to study contractivity and invariance of sets for the collective dynamics (1)-(2). In particular, we consider the collective value function n i=1 V i,T (ξ(t), t) assuming each player i ∈ N employs a T -stage receding horizon strategy with the optimal cost V i,T (ξ(·), ·) defined in (5).
Motivations
Coalitional games.
The set X introduced above can be thought of as the core of a coalitional game with Transferable Utilities (TU game).
A coalitional TU game is defined by a pair N, η , where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and η : 2 N → R a function defined for each coalition S ⊆ N (S ∈ 2 N ). The function η determines the value η(S) assigned to each coalition S ⊂ N , with η(∅) = 0. We let η S be the value η(S) of the characteristic function η associated with a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N . Given a TU game N, η , let C(η) be the core of the game,
Essentially, the core of the game is the set of all allocations that make the grand coalition stable with respect to all subcoalitions. Condition
nonempty S ⊂ N is referred to as "stability with respect to subcoalitions", since it guarantees that the total amount given to the members of a coalition exceeds the value of the coalition itself. Also, the averaging process in (4) can be justified as inequity aversion on the part of the players.
Social networks.
Opinion dynamics has attracted the attention of many scientists over the the past few years. The propagation of the opinions describe the time evolution of the beliefs of a large population of agents as a result of repeated interactions among the agents, in many cases over a social network (see e.g. Castellano et al., 2009, Sect. III, and Ozdaglar, 2011) . In continuous opinion dynamics models, beliefs or opinions are represented by scalars or vectors, evolving according to some averaging process. The latter consists in each opinion moving towards a convex combination of (a subset of) other agents' current beliefs, thus modeling the attractive nature of social influence. There are many models that, under the assumption that the underlying social network is connected, prove that the agents' opinions reach consensus asymptotically. Some exceptions can be found in the models by Krause (2000) where the authors introduce homophily in the form of "bounded confidence", by that meaning that the agents are not influenced by far beliefs. A similar behavior can be found also in models with competing stubborn agents (Acemoglu et al., 2013) , the latter being agents that do not change their opinions but try to influence the others' opinions. Such stubborn agents might represent leaders, political parties or media sources. For instance, Como and Fagnani (2011) provide scaling limits showing that if the agents' population is homogeneous, then, as the population size grows large, the empirical belief distribution converges towards the solution of a certain deterministic mean-field differential equation in the space of probability measures. Such results are in the spirit of the propagation of chaos (Sznitman, 1991) in interacting particle systems.
Main assumptions
Following (Nedić et al., 2010) (see also Nedić and Bauso, 2013) we make the following assumptions on the information structure. Let A(t) be the weight matrix with entries a i j (t). Assumption 1. The matrix A(t) is doubly stochastic with positive diagonal. Furthermore, there exists a scalar α > 0 such that a i j (t) ≥ α whenever a i j (t) > 0.
At any time, the instantaneous graph G(t) need not be connected. However, for the proper behavior of the process, the union of the graphs G(t) over a period of time is assumed to be connected. Assumption 2. There exists an integer Q ≥ 1 such that the graph N,
For simplicity the one-shot vector-payoff game (S 1 , S 2 , x i ) is denoted by G.
Let λ ∈ R n . Denote by λ, G the zero-sum one-shot game whose set of players and their action sets are as in the game G, and the payoff that player i 2 pays to player i 1 is λ φ(j, k) for every (j, k) ∈ S 1 × S 2 .
The resulting zero-sum game is described by the matrix
. As a zero-sum one-shot game, the game λ, G has a value v λ , where
Following Blackwell (1956) , we assume next that the value of the projected game is always negative. Assumption 3. The payoff φ(j, k) is bounded, and (a). v λ < 0, for all λ ∈ R n ; (b). for all q ∈ ∆(S 2 ) and > 0, there exists p ∈ ∆(S 1 ) such that j∈S1,k∈S2 p j φ(j, k)q j ≤ .
Condition (a) of Assumption 3 is among the foundations of approachability theory as it guarantees that the average vector payoff of a two-player repeated game converges almost surely to X (see e.g. Blackwell, 1956 , and also CesaBianchi and Lugosi, 2006, chapter 7). For future purposes we introduce the maximal value of the projected game, which is given byṽ := max
We show below thatṽ is related to the rate of convergence to the target set. Condition (b) implies that the norm of u i (t) in (2) can be made arbitrarily small, so that player i 1 effectively has the right of veto over any strategy of their opponent i 2 . This condition ensures that any target set X is controlled invariant, as we show below.
MAIN RESULT
The main result of this paper establishes contractivity and invariance for the collective dynamics (1-2) under the multi-stage receding horizon strategy defined in (5). Before stating the theorem we introduce three lemmas. The first of these establishes that the space averaging process in (1) reduces the total distance (i.e. the sum of distances) of the states from the set X. Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then the total distance from X decreases when replacing the states x i (t) by their space averages w i (t), i.e.,
Proof. Given in the appendix.
As a preliminary step to the next result, observe that, from the definition of | · | X and from (1) and (3), we can write
The following lemma states that, under the approachability assumption, there necessarily exists an input u i (t) given by (2) that places the successor state x i (t + 1) closer to X than the space average w i (t). Lemma 2. Let Assumption 3 hold. Then for each i ∈ N there exists u i (t) satisfying (2) and
Lemma 2 shows that the constraint incorporated in the definition of the receding horizon strategy in (5) is feasible for all collective states ξ(t). The next result provides upper and lower bounds on the collective value function n i=1 V i,T in terms of the sum of the distances of each invidual player's state from X. Lemma 3. The value functions
For r > 0, let Φ(r) denote the set
and, for any positive integer T , define r T by
wherex i (t) for t ∈ [0, T ] denotes the evolution of (1)- (2) under the min-max strategy with value function V i,T −t (x 1 (t), . . . ,x n (t)), t in (5) and withx i (0) = x i (0).
We are now ready to state the main result. Theorem 1. (Contractivity and invariance) Let Assumptions 1-3 hold and let ξ(0) ∈ Φ(r) for some r > 0. Then under the receding horizon strategy with optimal cost V i,T (ξ(t), t) for all i ∈ N and all t = 0, 1, . . . we have ξ(t) ∈ Φ(r) ∀t > 0, (9) and if r ≤ r T , then ξ(t) converges exponentially to X:
Discussion
Theorem 1 demonstrates that there exist both invariant and contractive sets for the collective dynamics. In particular, the receding horizon policy renders the set Φ(r) invariant irrespective of the choice of the horizon T . Essentially this is due to the imposition of the constraint |x i (t + 1)| X ≤ |w i (t)| X in the definition of the receding horizon policy, which, as a result of the space averaging process in (1), enforces invariance globally without requiring knowledge of other players' current actions.
The convergence rate of the collective state to X in (10) decreases as T increases. Essentially this is a result of the looseness of the upper bound in Lemma 3, according to which the rate of decrease of the accumulated cost represents a smaller fraction of the bound on V i,T (ξ(t), t) as T increases. By increasing T however, it is possible to reach the target set X in T steps from a larger set of initial conditions ξ(0); increasing T thus increases the applicability of the contractivity result in (10) by allowing for larger values of r T .
SIMULATION EXAMPLE
We provide here numerical studies showing contractivity and invariance in opinion propagation. The algorithm used to perform the simulations is illustrated below. We consider a number of players ν = 10 3 and a discretized set of states X = {x min , x min + 1, . . . , x max } where x min = 0 (minimum state) and x max = 100 (maximum state). The simulation parameters are listed in Table 1 . We assume that the step size for the simulation is dt = 0.01. The horizon length, which corresponds to the number of iterations, is chosen as T = 40. This length of horizon is sufficient to highlight the convergence properties of the population opinions.
For a specific choice of weights a i , i = 1, . . . , n, the dynamics (1) have the form
where we have replaced
The above dynamics represents the case of a fully connected network where every agent's opinion is subject to an attractive force from the averagem(t).
We assume that the set of initial states are obtained from an initial Gaussian distribution m 0 with mean m 0 equal to Table 2 . Varying simulation parameters with different regimes.
Algorithm
Input: Set of parameters as in Table 1 Output: Distribution function m t , mean m t and standard deviation std(m t ). 1 : Initialize. Generate x i (0) from Gaussian distribution with meanm 0 and standard dev. std(m 0 ), 2 : for time t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do 3 : if t > 0, then compute m t , m t , and std(m t ), 4 : end if 5 : for player i = 1, 2, . . . , n do 6 : compute x i (t + 1) by solving (3), 7 : end for 8 : end for; 9 : STOP 50. For the three simulation examples we set the standard deviation std(m 0 ) equal to 8, 10, and 15, respectively. For Case II we increase β, which means that the attraction force among the opinions is stronger. Figure 4 (left) from top to bottom shows that the stream of opinions reach consensus while the consensus value approaches zero. This behavior reflects also in a rapid decrease of the standard deviation std(m t ) which reaches zero around t = 10. 
CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed convergence conditions of a distributed allocation process arising in the context of TU games. 
Summing both sides over i = 1, . . . , n we obtain
where the last equality follows from the stochasticity of A(t) in Assumption 1. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. Rearranging equation (7) we obtain
Now Assumption 3 implies that for any w i (t) ∈ R n , there exists a mixed strategy p(t) ∈ ∆(S 1 ) for Player i 1 such that, for any mixed strategy q(t) ∈ ∆(S 2 ) of Player i 2 ,
Furthermore by Assumption 3, p(t) ∈ ∆(S 1 ) can be chosen so that u i (t) is arbitrarily small, and from the convexity of ∆(S 1 ) it follows that (12) we therefore obtain
This bound is negative if u i (t) < 2 |ṽ| L |w i (t)| X , whereas |x i (t + 1)| X = 0 if |w i (t)| X = 0 and u i (t) = 0. 2 Proof of Lemma 3. The lower bound in (8) follows directly from the fact that V i,T −1 (ξ, ·) ≥ 0 for any horizon T ≥ 1 and all ξ ∈ R n × · · · × R n .
To prove the upper bound in (8), consider first the case of T = 1. The definition of V i,0 (ξ, ·) = |x i (·)| 2 X and the constraint |x i (t + 1)| X ≤ |w i (t)| X (which is necessarily feasible by Lemma 2) imply, for all i ∈ N , that V i,1 (ξ(t), t) = |x i (t)| 
Consider next the case of T > 1. If the upper bound in (8) holds for a horizon of T − 1, then since the constraints |x i (t + 1)| X ≤ |w i (t)| X for all i ∈ N imply (by Lemma 1) that
The upper bound in (8) follows by induction using (13) and (14). 2 Proof of Theorem 1. The positive invariance of Φ(r) for any r > 0 in (9) is a consequence of the constraint |x i (t + 1)| X ≤ |w i (t)| X that is imposed on the optimal receding horizon policy in (5). Specifically, by Lemma 2 this constraint is necessarily feasible, and Lemma 1 implies The contractivity and exponential convergence in (10) results from ξ(0) ∈ Φ(r T ), since, from the definition of r T , the terminal state of (1)- (2) under the min-max optimal sequence {(p(0), q(0)), . . . , (p(T − 1), q(T − 1))} for (5) satisfies |x i (T )| X = 0, from which it follows that V i,T −1 ξ(0), 0 = V i,T ξ(0), 0 . Furthermore (9) implies ξ(t) ∈ Φ(r T ) ∀t ≥ 0, and therefore V i,T (ξ(t), t) = |x i (t)| 2 X + min p(t)∈∆(S1) max q(t)∈∆(S2) uj (t),j =i,j∈N V i,T −1 (ξ(t + 1), t + 1) ≤ |x i (t)| 2 X + V i,T −1 (ξ(t + 1), t + 1) = |x i (t)| 2 X + V i,T (ξ(t + 1), t + 1) for all t ≥ 0. Summing this inequality over i ∈ N and using the upper bound of Lemma 3 gives n i=1 V i,T (ξ(t + 1), t + 1) − V i,T (ξ(t), t) ≤ − 
